School accountability:

Can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?

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Mission impossible?



Mission impossible!



Compromise solutions in theory

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- s_j^{VA} ... is a special case of s_j^{RA}
- `constant & slope ...`

Two simulations

incentive	for	good administration					pupil selection				
change	=	$\Delta\widehat{\beta}_{j,k}=\sigma(\beta_{j,k})$ & $\Delta\widehat{v}_j$ s.t. $\Delta\overline{y}_j = 0$					$\Delta\overline{z}_{b,k} = \sigma(\overline{z}_{b,k})$				
measure	=	Δs_j					Δs_j				
ideally	=	zero everywhere					zero everywhere				
statistic	=	p10	p50	p90	%<0	%>0	p10	p50	p90	%<0	%>0
RA, with	$\widetilde{\beta}$ low	zero everywhere									
	$\widetilde{\beta}$ mid	zero everywhere									
	$\widetilde{\beta}$ high	zero everywhere									
VA		zero everywhere									
RB, with	$\widetilde{z}$ low						zero everywhere				
	$\widetilde{z}$ mid						zero everywhere				
	$\widetilde{z}$ high						zero everywhere				
UO		zero everywhere									

Incentives for good administration

incentive change = measure = ideally =	for =	good administration $\Delta\widehat{\beta}_{j,k}=\sigma(\beta_{j,k})$ & $\Delta\widehat{v}_j$ s.t. $\Delta\overline{y}_j = 0$ Δs_j zero everywhere					pupil selection $\Delta\overline{z}_{b,k} = \sigma(\overline{z}_{b,k})$ Δs_j zero everywhere				
statistic	=	p10	p50	p90	%<0	%>0	p10	p50	p90	%<0	%>0
RA, with	$\widetilde{\beta}$ low	zero everywhere									
	$\widetilde{\beta}$ mid	zero everywhere									
	$\widetilde{\beta}$ high	zero everywhere									
VA		zero everywhere									
RB, with	$\widetilde{z}$ low	-0.08	-0.05	-0.02	95.9%	4.1%	zero everywhere				
	$\widetilde{z}$ mid	-0.02	0.00	0.03	51.3%	48.7%	zero everywhere				
	$\widetilde{z}$ high	0.00	0.03	0.06	5.6%	94.4%	zero everywhere				
UO		zero everywhere									

Incentives for pupil selection

incentive	for	good administration $\Delta\widehat{\beta}_{j,k}=\sigma(\beta_{j,k})$ & $\Delta\widehat{v}_j$ s.t. $\Delta\overline{y}_j = 0$					pupil selection $\Delta\overline{z}_{b,k} = \sigma(\overline{z}_{b,k})$				
change	=	Δs_j					Δs_j				
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ideally	=										
statistic	=	p10	p50	p90	%<0	%>0	p10	p50	p90	%<0	%>0
RA, with	$\widetilde{\beta}$ low	zero everywhere					0.00	0.03	0.07	5.3%	94.7%
	$\widetilde{\beta}$ mid	zero everywhere					-0.03	0.00	0.03	50.7%	49.3%
	$\widetilde{\beta}$ high	zero everywhere					-0.07	-0.04	0.00	95.4%	4.6%
VA		zero everywhere					-0.03	0.00	0.03	47.6%	52.4%
RB, with	$\widetilde{z}$ low						zero everywhere				
	$\widetilde{z}$ mid						zero everywhere				
	$\widetilde{z}$ high						zero everywhere				
UO		zero everywhere					0.11	0.14	0.17	0%	100%